Coopetition-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing

Youqi Li*, Fan Li, Song Yang, Chuan Zhang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

Most of the existing works on MCS only consider designing incentive mechanisms for a single MCS platform. In this chapter, we study the incentive mechanism in MCS with multiple platforms under two scenarios: competitive platform and cooperative platform. We correspondingly propose new competitive and cooperative mechanisms for each scenario. In the competitive platform scenario, platforms decide their prices on rewards to attract more participants, while the users choose which platform to work for. We model such a competitive platform scenario as a two-stage Stackelberg game. In the cooperative platform scenario, platforms cooperate to share sensing data with each other. We model it as many-to-many bargaining. Moreover, we first prove the NP-hardness of exact bargaining and then propose heuristic bargaining. Finally, numerical results show that (1) platforms in the competitive platform scenario can guarantee their payoff by optimally pricing on rewards and participants can select the best platform to contribute; (2) platforms in the cooperative platform scenario can further improve their payoff by bargaining with other platforms for cooperatively sharing collected sensing data.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSpringerBriefs in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer
Pages95-123
Number of pages29
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2024

Publication series

NameSpringerBriefs in Computer Science
VolumePart F2071
ISSN (Print)2191-5768
ISSN (Electronic)2191-5776

Keywords

  • Coexistence
  • Competitive interaction
  • Cooperative interaction
  • Many-to-many bargaining
  • Multiple platforms
  • Two-stage Stackelberg game

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