Coopetition-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing

Youqi Li*, Fan Li, Song Yang, Chuan Zhang

*此作品的通讯作者

科研成果: 书/报告/会议事项章节章节同行评审

摘要

Most of the existing works on MCS only consider designing incentive mechanisms for a single MCS platform. In this chapter, we study the incentive mechanism in MCS with multiple platforms under two scenarios: competitive platform and cooperative platform. We correspondingly propose new competitive and cooperative mechanisms for each scenario. In the competitive platform scenario, platforms decide their prices on rewards to attract more participants, while the users choose which platform to work for. We model such a competitive platform scenario as a two-stage Stackelberg game. In the cooperative platform scenario, platforms cooperate to share sensing data with each other. We model it as many-to-many bargaining. Moreover, we first prove the NP-hardness of exact bargaining and then propose heuristic bargaining. Finally, numerical results show that (1) platforms in the competitive platform scenario can guarantee their payoff by optimally pricing on rewards and participants can select the best platform to contribute; (2) platforms in the cooperative platform scenario can further improve their payoff by bargaining with other platforms for cooperatively sharing collected sensing data.

源语言英语
主期刊名SpringerBriefs in Computer Science
出版商Springer
95-123
页数29
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 2024

出版系列

姓名SpringerBriefs in Computer Science
Part F2071
ISSN(印刷版)2191-5768
ISSN(电子版)2191-5776

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