TY - CHAP
T1 - Coopetition-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing
AU - Li, Youqi
AU - Li, Fan
AU - Yang, Song
AU - Zhang, Chuan
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd 2024.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - Most of the existing works on MCS only consider designing incentive mechanisms for a single MCS platform. In this chapter, we study the incentive mechanism in MCS with multiple platforms under two scenarios: competitive platform and cooperative platform. We correspondingly propose new competitive and cooperative mechanisms for each scenario. In the competitive platform scenario, platforms decide their prices on rewards to attract more participants, while the users choose which platform to work for. We model such a competitive platform scenario as a two-stage Stackelberg game. In the cooperative platform scenario, platforms cooperate to share sensing data with each other. We model it as many-to-many bargaining. Moreover, we first prove the NP-hardness of exact bargaining and then propose heuristic bargaining. Finally, numerical results show that (1) platforms in the competitive platform scenario can guarantee their payoff by optimally pricing on rewards and participants can select the best platform to contribute; (2) platforms in the cooperative platform scenario can further improve their payoff by bargaining with other platforms for cooperatively sharing collected sensing data.
AB - Most of the existing works on MCS only consider designing incentive mechanisms for a single MCS platform. In this chapter, we study the incentive mechanism in MCS with multiple platforms under two scenarios: competitive platform and cooperative platform. We correspondingly propose new competitive and cooperative mechanisms for each scenario. In the competitive platform scenario, platforms decide their prices on rewards to attract more participants, while the users choose which platform to work for. We model such a competitive platform scenario as a two-stage Stackelberg game. In the cooperative platform scenario, platforms cooperate to share sensing data with each other. We model it as many-to-many bargaining. Moreover, we first prove the NP-hardness of exact bargaining and then propose heuristic bargaining. Finally, numerical results show that (1) platforms in the competitive platform scenario can guarantee their payoff by optimally pricing on rewards and participants can select the best platform to contribute; (2) platforms in the cooperative platform scenario can further improve their payoff by bargaining with other platforms for cooperatively sharing collected sensing data.
KW - Coexistence
KW - Competitive interaction
KW - Cooperative interaction
KW - Many-to-many bargaining
KW - Multiple platforms
KW - Two-stage Stackelberg game
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85182867468&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-981-99-6921-0_5
DO - 10.1007/978-981-99-6921-0_5
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85182867468
T3 - SpringerBriefs in Computer Science
SP - 95
EP - 123
BT - SpringerBriefs in Computer Science
PB - Springer
ER -