Game model for governments to promote banks as the agency to supervise the implementation of green supply chain based on green credit

Yong Sheng Zhou, Qiao Rong Liu, Jian Li, Ying Xue Zhao

科研成果: 期刊稿件文章同行评审

5 引用 (Scopus)

摘要

This paper introduces the green credit to promote the development of green supply chain. We analyze the evolutionarily stable strategy by establishing evolutionary game model between governments and banks. Research result shows that when the cost of governments' examination is greater than the fine on banks' non-implement, governments will eventually choose non-examination; when the earnings of banks' implementation are more than that of bank's non-implementation, banks will eventually select implementation; when the difference of earnings between banks' non-implementation and implementa- tion is greater than that between subsidy on implementation and fine on non-implementation, banks will eventually choose non-implementation.

源语言英语
页(从-至)1744-1751
页数8
期刊Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice
35
7
出版状态已出版 - 25 7月 2015
已对外发布

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