Abstract
This paper introduces the green credit to promote the development of green supply chain. We analyze the evolutionarily stable strategy by establishing evolutionary game model between governments and banks. Research result shows that when the cost of governments' examination is greater than the fine on banks' non-implement, governments will eventually choose non-examination; when the earnings of banks' implementation are more than that of bank's non-implementation, banks will eventually select implementation; when the difference of earnings between banks' non-implementation and implementa- tion is greater than that between subsidy on implementation and fine on non-implementation, banks will eventually choose non-implementation.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1744-1751 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice |
Volume | 35 |
Issue number | 7 |
Publication status | Published - 25 Jul 2015 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Evolutionary game theory
- Government
- Government subsidies
- Green credit
- Green supply chain
- Penalties