Game model for governments to promote banks as the agency to supervise the implementation of green supply chain based on green credit

Yong Sheng Zhou, Qiao Rong Liu, Jian Li, Ying Xue Zhao

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper introduces the green credit to promote the development of green supply chain. We analyze the evolutionarily stable strategy by establishing evolutionary game model between governments and banks. Research result shows that when the cost of governments' examination is greater than the fine on banks' non-implement, governments will eventually choose non-examination; when the earnings of banks' implementation are more than that of bank's non-implementation, banks will eventually select implementation; when the difference of earnings between banks' non-implementation and implementa- tion is greater than that between subsidy on implementation and fine on non-implementation, banks will eventually choose non-implementation.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1744-1751
Number of pages8
JournalXitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice
Volume35
Issue number7
Publication statusPublished - 25 Jul 2015
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Evolutionary game theory
  • Government
  • Government subsidies
  • Green credit
  • Green supply chain
  • Penalties

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