A Reconnaissance Penetration Game With Territorial-Constrained Defender

Li Liang, Fang Deng*, Jianan Wang, Maobin Lu, Jie Chen

*此作品的通讯作者

科研成果: 期刊稿件文章同行评审

20 引用 (Scopus)

摘要

A reconnaissance penetration game is a classic target-attacker-defender game. In this game, a reconnaissance UAV (namely attacker) tries to avoid the defender and reconnoiter a target as close as possible, whereas a target tries to escape the attacker with the help of defender. Practically, the defender is considered constrained in a certain territory to capture the attacker and help the target. This article is primarily concerned with the winning region for three players. An explicit policy method is proposed to construct the barrier analytically. In addition, taking practical payoff functions into account, a complete solution to the reconnaissance game is provided by fusing the games of kind and degree. Simulation results are elaborated to showcase the effectiveness of the proposed policy.

源语言英语
页(从-至)6295-6302
页数8
期刊IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
67
11
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 1 11月 2022

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