Event-Triggered Mechanism-Based Discrete-Time Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Graphic Game With Outlier-Resistant ESO

Huanhuan Yuan, Liran Zhao, Yuan Yuan, Yuanqing Xia

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In this article, we consider a discrete-time Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for graphic game subject to disturbances. For the first-order dynamics, the discrete-time outlier-resistant extended state observer (ESO)-based game strategy is proposed to enable the players to estimate the disturbances under effect of anomaly measurements and then compensate them. An event-triggered mechanism is applied between adjacent players to reduce the frequency of communication. The convergence of the outlier-resistant ESO and control strategy is presented. Moreover, the upper bound of <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\epsilon$</tex-math> </inline-formula>-NE solution deviating from the unique point of nominal system is given analytically. Then, the addressed issues are extended to high-order game systems. The NE seeking-based control strategy for each player is designed such that the equilibrium point converges to the <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\epsilon$</tex-math> </inline-formula>-NE which is also analytically calculated. Finally, in order to verify the effectiveness of the proposed game strategy, an example of satellite system is given.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-13
Number of pages13
JournalIEEE Transactions on Cybernetics
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2024

Keywords

  • Cost function
  • Estimation error
  • Event-triggered mechanism
  • Games
  • Graphics
  • Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking
  • Observers
  • Pollution measurement
  • Upper bound
  • graphic game
  • outlier-resistant extended state observer (ESO)

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