TY - JOUR
T1 - Technology Investment Strategy for a Competitive Manufacturer in the Presence of Technology Spillover
AU - Li, Guo
AU - Wu, Huamin
AU - Zheng, Hong
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 1988-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2023/3/1
Y1 - 2023/3/1
N2 - Motivated by the practices of technology investment in the new energy vehicle manufacturing industry, this article investigates an outsourcing supply chain in which an original brand manufacturer (OBM) possessing the core new energy technology R&D outsources production to a competitive manufacturer (CM). To cater to market demands and increase market competitiveness, the CM may actively invest in technology with the OBM or by himself, or not, i.e., Strategies JI, OI, and NI, respectively. In particular, owing to technology spillover effect, the CM could use the technology inferior to the OBM's to produce his own-branded products in Strategy NI. Our results reveal that the OBM consistently profits the most in Strategy JI. However, the CM's preference strategy is influenced by the competition intensity, technology spillover level, consumers' product preference, and cost-sharing ratio. In specific, when both the competition intensity and technology spillover are weak or the competition intensity is strong for arbitrary technology spillover level, the CM may prefer Strategy JI or OI depending on consumers' product preference and cost-sharing ratio and never prefers Strategy NI. However, when the competition intensity is weak but the technology spillover level is strong, the CM may prefer Strategy NI in certain situations. Furthermore, our study extends the model to involve variable production costs, and reveals that the main results derived in the basic model still hold.
AB - Motivated by the practices of technology investment in the new energy vehicle manufacturing industry, this article investigates an outsourcing supply chain in which an original brand manufacturer (OBM) possessing the core new energy technology R&D outsources production to a competitive manufacturer (CM). To cater to market demands and increase market competitiveness, the CM may actively invest in technology with the OBM or by himself, or not, i.e., Strategies JI, OI, and NI, respectively. In particular, owing to technology spillover effect, the CM could use the technology inferior to the OBM's to produce his own-branded products in Strategy NI. Our results reveal that the OBM consistently profits the most in Strategy JI. However, the CM's preference strategy is influenced by the competition intensity, technology spillover level, consumers' product preference, and cost-sharing ratio. In specific, when both the competition intensity and technology spillover are weak or the competition intensity is strong for arbitrary technology spillover level, the CM may prefer Strategy JI or OI depending on consumers' product preference and cost-sharing ratio and never prefers Strategy NI. However, when the competition intensity is weak but the technology spillover level is strong, the CM may prefer Strategy NI in certain situations. Furthermore, our study extends the model to involve variable production costs, and reveals that the main results derived in the basic model still hold.
KW - Game theory
KW - production outsourcing
KW - supply chain management
KW - technology effort
KW - technology spillover
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85115675712&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/TEM.2021.3105014
DO - 10.1109/TEM.2021.3105014
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85115675712
SN - 0018-9391
VL - 70
SP - 1162
EP - 1173
JO - IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
JF - IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
IS - 3
ER -