TY - GEN
T1 - ReaderPrint
T2 - 19th Annual IEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication, and Networking, SECON 2022
AU - Zhu, Yinan
AU - Duan, Chunhui
AU - Ding, Xuan
AU - Yang, Zheng
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 IEEE.
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - Unauthorized access attack has always been a critical problem in RFID systems since any illegitimate reader can conduct access commands on tags without authorization and leave no trace. Past solutions for reader authentication require either modifications on EPC-global Gen2 protocol, which are inapplicable to existing infrastructures, or numerous extra customized devices as communication monitors, which incur high overhead. In this paper, we present a universal, low-cost and effective system to authenticate RFID readers, namely ReaderPrint, which only requires an extra passive tag array and is fully compatible with Gen2 protocol. The key insight behind ReaderPrint is that the impedance mismatch degrees (IMD) of different reader antennas across channels are distinguishable. We verify this mechanism through empirical studies using vector network analyzer and further propose two brand-new forms of hardware fingerprints, i.e., IMD-induced transmission power attenuation (ITPA) and phase shifts (IPS) across channels to quantify the IMD. Besides, to address the negative impacts of environmental changes, well-refined fingerprint matching algorithms are designed accordingly. We implement a prototype of ReaderPrint and evaluate it on 96 different readers in three indoor scenarios. Experimental results show that ReaderPrint can achieve fairly high authentication accuracy of up to 97.2%, regardless of environmental or device conditions.
AB - Unauthorized access attack has always been a critical problem in RFID systems since any illegitimate reader can conduct access commands on tags without authorization and leave no trace. Past solutions for reader authentication require either modifications on EPC-global Gen2 protocol, which are inapplicable to existing infrastructures, or numerous extra customized devices as communication monitors, which incur high overhead. In this paper, we present a universal, low-cost and effective system to authenticate RFID readers, namely ReaderPrint, which only requires an extra passive tag array and is fully compatible with Gen2 protocol. The key insight behind ReaderPrint is that the impedance mismatch degrees (IMD) of different reader antennas across channels are distinguishable. We verify this mechanism through empirical studies using vector network analyzer and further propose two brand-new forms of hardware fingerprints, i.e., IMD-induced transmission power attenuation (ITPA) and phase shifts (IPS) across channels to quantify the IMD. Besides, to address the negative impacts of environmental changes, well-refined fingerprint matching algorithms are designed accordingly. We implement a prototype of ReaderPrint and evaluate it on 96 different readers in three indoor scenarios. Experimental results show that ReaderPrint can achieve fairly high authentication accuracy of up to 97.2%, regardless of environmental or device conditions.
KW - Impedance mismatch
KW - RFID
KW - Reader hardware fingerprint
KW - Unauthorized access attack
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85141153343&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/SECON55815.2022.9918585
DO - 10.1109/SECON55815.2022.9918585
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85141153343
T3 - Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks workshops
SP - 352
EP - 360
BT - 2022 19th Annual IEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication, and Networking, SECON 2022
PB - IEEE Computer Society
Y2 - 20 September 2022 through 23 September 2022
ER -