Pay as How You Behave: A Truthful Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing

Chang Xu, Yayun Si, Liehuang Zhu*, Chuan Zhang, Kashif Sharif, Can Zhang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is widely applied in large-scale distributed networks for collecting sensing data from workers. In an MCS system, workers are recruited to complete tasks for data requesters, and they will get profits. Accordingly, how to establish an effective incentive mechanism has become an important issue to consider. Since workers are naturally selfish, they try to maximize individual benefits while minimize costs. In this article, we propose a truthful incentive mechanism which pays for the workers by the workers' performance in the task just completed and the reputation. For each worker, through the future prediction function, we get the reputation of the worker by utilizing the previous performances. In the proposed scheme, partial payment for the workers is distributed depending on workers' reputation. The final payment is based on punishments and rewards according to the performances. Moreover, data accuracy and response time are introduced to evaluate the worker performance in the task. It can be demonstrated that the mechanism provides continuous incentives to workers compared to the single ex-ante and ex-post pricing schemes. The experimental results show that our mechanism is effective.

Original languageEnglish
Article number8796391
Pages (from-to)10053-10063
Number of pages11
JournalIEEE Internet of Things Journal
Volume6
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2019

Keywords

  • Incentive mechanism
  • mobile crowdsensing (MCS)
  • pricing
  • reputation
  • truth discovery (TD)

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