基于能量分析技术的芯片后门指令分析方法

Translated title of the contribution: A Power Analysis Method Against Backdoor Instruction in Chips

Xiang Liang Ma*, Hong Wang, Bing Li, Jin She Fang, Yan Yan, Xue Wen Bai, An Wang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The backdoor instruction of chip is one of the typical ways to activate hardware Trojan, which has high security risk and a wide range of impact besides being difficult to be detected.In this paper, we propose a detection method of the backdoor instruction based on power analysis technology.By utilizing the segmented exhausting process and some power traces, the backdoor instruction can be distinguished from the conventional instruction effectively.The experiments show that the backdoor instruction can be analyzed successfully from the power traces by simple power analysis (SPA).Moreover, we also present an automatic detection method for the backdoor instruction based on correlation power analysis (CPA).By comparing the correlation coefficient with the mean value of the coefficient, backdoor instruction can be analyzed efficiently and automatically.

Translated title of the contributionA Power Analysis Method Against Backdoor Instruction in Chips
Original languageChinese (Traditional)
Pages (from-to)686-691
Number of pages6
JournalTien Tzu Hsueh Pao/Acta Electronica Sinica
Volume47
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2019

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