摘要
Producing hydrogen from coal with carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) could be pivotal to establishing a hydrogen economy. It is crucial to study the behavioral strategies of the parties involved in the diffusion of CCUS technology. This paper fills the gap in existing research by developing an evolutionary game model between energy companies and oil fields with commercial cooperation to analyze their interactions. Based on the numerical simulation, the effects of critical parameters on evolution trajectories were analyzed and discussed. The results indicate that neither coal-to-hydrogen enterprises nor oil fields are presently willing to participate in CCUS projects, so appropriate incentives must be taken to promote its advancement. Empirical studies have found that, with other conditions unchanged: (i) A blue hydrogen price of CNY 35.6/kg H2 and a carbon market price of CNY 150/t CO2 can promote hydrogen production enterprises to engage in low-carbon production; (ii) The establishment of a carbon tax policy about CNY 130/t CO2 can also motivate hydrogen plants to install carbon capture devices and reduce greenhouse gas emissions to avoid heavy penalties; (iii) A mature oil market and its high price level is sufficient to offset the inhibiting effect of higher carbon market prices on the willingness of oil fields to cooperate; (iv) Government subsidy policies need to be organically combined with market mechanisms such as carbon tax to effectively reduce the investment risks of enterprises and promote project cooperation.
源语言 | 英语 |
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页(从-至) | 1159-1170 |
页数 | 12 |
期刊 | International Journal of Hydrogen Energy |
卷 | 96 |
DOI | |
出版状态 | 已出版 - 27 12月 2024 |