The perishable goods buyer pricing opaque sales mode set the opacity of strategy analysis

Jun Li Lei, Jin Lin Li*, Lun Ran, Wen Si Zhang

*此作品的通讯作者

科研成果: 期刊稿件文章同行评审

摘要

Based on non-cooperative game theory with incomplete information, the game between suppliers and agents during the opaque sales was analyzed. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium threshold price which settled by suppliers and the opacity setting strategy of agents were obtained. The results show that under the premise of the customer's successful bidding, the more the number of suppliers, the higher the information rent which agents gain from the game. However, with the increase in the number of suppliers, the opacity of goods also increase which result in the decreasing of customer's quotation. Thus, the agents need to make a trade-off between their earnings and the opacity degree of their product.

源语言英语
页(从-至)1-6
页数6
期刊Beijing Ligong Daxue Xuebao/Transaction of Beijing Institute of Technology
34
出版状态已出版 - 1 10月 2014

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Lei, J. L., Li, J. L., Ran, L., & Zhang, W. S. (2014). The perishable goods buyer pricing opaque sales mode set the opacity of strategy analysis. Beijing Ligong Daxue Xuebao/Transaction of Beijing Institute of Technology, 34, 1-6.