The credibility-based cores in games with fuzzy coalitions

Lun Ran*, Jinhui Pang, Pengfei Bai

*此作品的通讯作者

科研成果: 书/报告/会议事项章节会议稿件同行评审

摘要

In an uncertain game environment, it is usually difficult to solve the least core because the rates of players' participation must hold for some real number which belong to [0,1]. In addition, available characteristic function sometimes cannot be accurately given either when the rates are allowed to be fuzzy variables. In this paper, fuzzy coalitions, fuzzy characteristic function and fuzzy cores are studied based on the Choquet integral and the credibility measure. A new fuzzy chance-constrained programming model is proposed for solving the least core under a predetermined confidence level, which is also a game decision procedure for generating cores converging to elements of the fuzzy core to meet different confidence level. It is shown that the least core gained by the presented model coincides with Aubin's core for a specific class of games with fuzzy coalition and reflect the influence rooted in players' preference. A numerical example is presented to show the model idea and its rational property.

源语言英语
主期刊名2010 International Conference on Logistics Systems and Intelligent Management, ICLSIM 2010
416-420
页数5
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 2010
活动2010 International Conference on Logistics Systems and Intelligent Management, ICLSIM 2010 - Harbin, 中国
期限: 9 1月 201010 1月 2010

出版系列

姓名2010 International Conference on Logistics Systems and Intelligent Management, ICLSIM 2010
1

会议

会议2010 International Conference on Logistics Systems and Intelligent Management, ICLSIM 2010
国家/地区中国
Harbin
时期9/01/1010/01/10

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