Study on evolution of enterprise's energy consumption behavior under public participation

Weihua Qu, Zhijun Yan*

*此作品的通讯作者

    科研成果: 期刊稿件文章同行评审

    5 引用 (Scopus)

    摘要

    Enterprise energy consumption leading to environment pollution has been a heavily impact on public health, and hinders sustainable development of ecological civilization. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper studies interactive mechanisms between public participation in environment management and high pollution industries around public health damage penalty. Three game scenarios, the lower health damage compensation, the higher compensation, the larger enough health damage compensation and high additional sales are established. It shows the influence of different of decision-making parameters and change of initial condition on evolution results by numerical experiments. The research results show that, the evolution of enterprise's energy consumption behavior has significant difference in different scenario. The three main factors, health damage compensation_energy transition costs and additional income contribute to enterprise's transformation strategy and the public participating in environmental management. The public and polluting enterprises converges to non-participation in environmental management, implementation of energy transformation with lager enough health damage compensation high implementation of energy transformation of over 95% in polluting enterprises groups and high additional sales. The conclusion has important instruction meaning and reference value for improving public health.

    源语言英语
    页(从-至)2537-2548
    页数12
    期刊Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice
    36
    10
    DOI
    出版状态已出版 - 25 10月 2016

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