TY - GEN
T1 - Stackelberg Game for Resource Sharing in Mobile Cloud Workflow Management Via a Direct Approach
AU - Chen, Yuehong
AU - Xia, Yuanqing
AU - Yuan, Huanhuan
AU - Zhan, Yufeng
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 IEEE.
PY - 2018/7/2
Y1 - 2018/7/2
N2 - Mobile cloud computing(MCC) is a promising technology that fully utilizing the idle resources of mobile devices to improve the system performance. But the devices are self-interested and rational, they may be unwilling to share their resources with the devices of which workflows can not be processed immediately due to constrained resources. To address this problem, a Stackelberg game is formulated between the demanding users and supplier for MCC, which is a direct method rather than one that needs a broker or auctioneer in the previous works. First, we give the system model in which the satisfaction function is first considered in MCC. Next, the Stackelberg game is analysed and it is proved that there exists a unique equilibrium. From the perspectives of fairness and profit, separately, incentive mechanisms of uniform pricing and nonuniform pricing strategies for supplier are adopted, respectively. Finally, simulation results validate the efficiency of the proposed algorithm and demonstrate the non-uniform pricing outperforms the uniform pricing scheme. The effects of changing system parameters on the system performance are also shown.
AB - Mobile cloud computing(MCC) is a promising technology that fully utilizing the idle resources of mobile devices to improve the system performance. But the devices are self-interested and rational, they may be unwilling to share their resources with the devices of which workflows can not be processed immediately due to constrained resources. To address this problem, a Stackelberg game is formulated between the demanding users and supplier for MCC, which is a direct method rather than one that needs a broker or auctioneer in the previous works. First, we give the system model in which the satisfaction function is first considered in MCC. Next, the Stackelberg game is analysed and it is proved that there exists a unique equilibrium. From the perspectives of fairness and profit, separately, incentive mechanisms of uniform pricing and nonuniform pricing strategies for supplier are adopted, respectively. Finally, simulation results validate the efficiency of the proposed algorithm and demonstrate the non-uniform pricing outperforms the uniform pricing scheme. The effects of changing system parameters on the system performance are also shown.
KW - Mobile cloud computing
KW - Stackelberg game
KW - incentive mechanism
KW - resource sharing
KW - workflow management
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85062797120&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/CAC.2018.8623730
DO - 10.1109/CAC.2018.8623730
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85062797120
T3 - Proceedings 2018 Chinese Automation Congress, CAC 2018
SP - 3672
EP - 3677
BT - Proceedings 2018 Chinese Automation Congress, CAC 2018
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2018 Chinese Automation Congress, CAC 2018
Y2 - 30 November 2018 through 2 December 2018
ER -