TY - JOUR
T1 - Return strategy and pricing in a dual-channel supply chain
AU - Li, Guo
AU - Li, Lin
AU - Sethi, Suresh P.
AU - Guan, Xu
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2019/9
Y1 - 2019/9
N2 - This study investigates the strategic effect of return policies in a dual-channel supply chain, in which a manufacturer can sell products directly to end customers and indirectly via an independent retailer. The manufacturer decides whether to implement a return policy in either the direct or indirect channel, or in both channels. When the return policy is provided, the cost of returned products has to be covered by the corresponding channel. We consider four possible strategies, including full refund in the direct channel only, full refund in the indirect channel only, full refund in both channels, and no refund in both channels. Given the equilibrium pricing strategies of firms, the preferences of firms over different strategies are determined by comparisons between the anticipated return rate of customers and their perceived value of the return policy. The manufacturer prefers the full-refund policy in both channels when the return rate of the customer is low. Otherwise, the dominant strategy for the manufacturer is the no-refund policy in both channels. The retailer benefits more from the full-refund policy in the indirect channel alone when the return rate is low; otherwise, the retailer prefers the full-refund policy in the direct channel only.
AB - This study investigates the strategic effect of return policies in a dual-channel supply chain, in which a manufacturer can sell products directly to end customers and indirectly via an independent retailer. The manufacturer decides whether to implement a return policy in either the direct or indirect channel, or in both channels. When the return policy is provided, the cost of returned products has to be covered by the corresponding channel. We consider four possible strategies, including full refund in the direct channel only, full refund in the indirect channel only, full refund in both channels, and no refund in both channels. Given the equilibrium pricing strategies of firms, the preferences of firms over different strategies are determined by comparisons between the anticipated return rate of customers and their perceived value of the return policy. The manufacturer prefers the full-refund policy in both channels when the return rate of the customer is low. Otherwise, the dominant strategy for the manufacturer is the no-refund policy in both channels. The retailer benefits more from the full-refund policy in the indirect channel alone when the return rate is low; otherwise, the retailer prefers the full-refund policy in the direct channel only.
KW - Direct channel
KW - Game theory
KW - Indirect channel
KW - Perceived value of return policy
KW - Return policy
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85023606904&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.ijpe.2017.06.031
DO - 10.1016/j.ijpe.2017.06.031
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85023606904
SN - 0925-5273
VL - 215
SP - 153
EP - 164
JO - International Journal of Production Economics
JF - International Journal of Production Economics
ER -