Quality prevention strategies in the model of agriculture-super docking

Yu Sheng Hu, Jin Lin Li*, Lun Ran, Wen Si Zhang

*此作品的通讯作者

科研成果: 期刊稿件文章同行评审

摘要

The quality prevention strategy of the famer specialized cooperatives was studied in the model of agriculture-super docking. The quality decision of the famer specialized cooperatives will be compared in the case of information symmetry and information asymmetry. The study was focused on the quality decision of the famer specialized cooperatives under the asymmetric information. The optimal solution of quality decision was obtained by the optimal control theory and Lagrange conditional extreme value under the asymmetric information. The results show that the more profit the famer specialized cooperatives generate by selling shoddy, the smaller amount of the quality prevention will be. In that case, the famer specialized cooperatives are easier to produce speculative psychology of selling shoddy. Under the asymmetric information situation, because the evaluating standard of supermarket is unobservable, the quality prevention costs of the famer specialized cooperatives will increase, the quality revenue of the famer specialized cooperatives will reduce.

源语言英语
页(从-至)108-111
页数4
期刊Beijing Ligong Daxue Xuebao/Transaction of Beijing Institute of Technology
34
出版状态已出版 - 1 10月 2014

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引用此

Hu, Y. S., Li, J. L., Ran, L., & Zhang, W. S. (2014). Quality prevention strategies in the model of agriculture-super docking. Beijing Ligong Daxue Xuebao/Transaction of Beijing Institute of Technology, 34, 108-111.