Optimal hierarchical allocation in deregulated electricity market under PSP auction mechanism

Zhongjing Ma, Yingying Cui

科研成果: 书/报告/会议事项章节会议稿件同行评审

4 引用 (Scopus)

摘要

In hierarchical electricity market, the retailers buy electricity from generation provider and then sell it to users. Retailers play an important role in the distribution channel by matching supply and demand, but they also potentially cause inefficiencies in electricity allocation. To induce an efficient allocation of electricity, we propose a novel hierarchical distributed method under PSP auction mechanism. Under this mechanism, each of players, either the generation provider or the retailers, obtains their electricity allocation through the PSP auction method by submitting a multi-dimensional bid profile, instead of telling their private cost or valuation function, then the retailers economically distribute the electricity, acquired in the PSP auction, among users. Moreover, the valuation function of retailers depends on the revenues that they sell the electricity to users. As a main result, in this paper we show that there exists an efficient Nash equilibrium (NE) for the underlying auction games.

源语言英语
主期刊名26th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2014
出版商IEEE Computer Society
2256-2261
页数6
ISBN(印刷版)9781479937066
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 2014
活动26th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2014 - Changsha, 中国
期限: 31 5月 20142 6月 2014

出版系列

姓名26th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2014

会议

会议26th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2014
国家/地区中国
Changsha
时期31/05/142/06/14

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