Inverse linear quadratic dynamic games using partial state observations

Chengpu Yu*, Yao Li, Shukai Li, Jie Chen

*此作品的通讯作者

科研成果: 期刊稿件文章同行评审

4 引用 (Scopus)

摘要

As an extension of the inverse optimal control, the inverse linear quadratic (LQ) two-player dynamic game is studied in this paper. The considered inverse problem is to infer the cost function of one player using partial state observations as well as the control inputs of the other player. An identification framework is designed by firstly decoupling the causal and anticausal parts of the associated Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation and then identifying the coefficient matrices in the cost function. The twofold features of the presented method include: (i) the data-driven identification approach provides an easy-to-implement solution which avoids the direct optimization of a non-convex inverse problem as well as complicated algebraic manipulations on Riccati equations; (ii) the identification framework does not rely on the initial states or terminal costates, which enables its implementation using only segments of data trajectories. The effectiveness of the proposed method is demonstrated by simulation examples.

源语言英语
文章编号110534
期刊Automatica
145
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 11月 2022

指纹

探究 'Inverse linear quadratic dynamic games using partial state observations' 的科研主题。它们共同构成独一无二的指纹。

引用此