TY - GEN
T1 - Incentives for delay-constrained data query in mobile opportunistic social networks
AU - Liu, Yang
AU - Yan, Liping
AU - Liu, Kun
AU - Li, Fan
AU - Deng, Zhihong
AU - Xia, Yuanqing
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 TCCT.
PY - 2016/8/26
Y1 - 2016/8/26
N2 - In this paper, we propose effective schemes to stimulate cooperation between selfish nodes for data query and feedback in mobile opportunistic social networks. A query issuer generates a query and requests reply within a given delay budget. When a data provider receives the query for the first time from an intermediate node, the former replies it, and authorizes the latter as the owner of the reply. Multiple copies of a query can be created and replied by different data providers. When a node that owns a reply meets the query issuer that generates the query, it requests the query issuer to pay credits. The query issuer pays credits and provides a feedback of the reply to the data provider. When a node that carries a feedback meets the data provider, the data provider pays credits to the node in order to adjust its claimed expertise. Queries, replies and feedbacks can be traded between mobile nodes. We propose an effective mechanism to define rewards for queries, replies and feedbacks. We formulate the bargain process as a two-person cooperative game, whose solution is found by using the Nash Theorem. Extensive simulations have been carried out based on real-world traces to evaluate the proposed schemes.
AB - In this paper, we propose effective schemes to stimulate cooperation between selfish nodes for data query and feedback in mobile opportunistic social networks. A query issuer generates a query and requests reply within a given delay budget. When a data provider receives the query for the first time from an intermediate node, the former replies it, and authorizes the latter as the owner of the reply. Multiple copies of a query can be created and replied by different data providers. When a node that owns a reply meets the query issuer that generates the query, it requests the query issuer to pay credits. The query issuer pays credits and provides a feedback of the reply to the data provider. When a node that carries a feedback meets the data provider, the data provider pays credits to the node in order to adjust its claimed expertise. Queries, replies and feedbacks can be traded between mobile nodes. We propose an effective mechanism to define rewards for queries, replies and feedbacks. We formulate the bargain process as a two-person cooperative game, whose solution is found by using the Nash Theorem. Extensive simulations have been carried out based on real-world traces to evaluate the proposed schemes.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84987851237&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ChiCC.2016.7554996
DO - 10.1109/ChiCC.2016.7554996
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84987851237
T3 - Chinese Control Conference, CCC
SP - 10363
EP - 10368
BT - Proceedings of the 35th Chinese Control Conference, CCC 2016
A2 - Chen, Jie
A2 - Zhao, Qianchuan
A2 - Chen, Jie
PB - IEEE Computer Society
T2 - 35th Chinese Control Conference, CCC 2016
Y2 - 27 July 2016 through 29 July 2016
ER -