Incentive Mechanism Design for Mobile Crowdsourcing Without Verification

Chao Huang, Haoran Yu, Jianwei Huang, Randall Berry*

*此作品的通讯作者

科研成果: 书/报告/会议事项章节章节同行评审

摘要

This chapter studies the design of incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsourcing systems in which verifying the underlying ground truth is not possible. Namely, we consider a crowdsourcing platform that seeks to incentivize a group of workers to put in effort and truthfully report solutions to a given task. Challenges in this setting include that the workers may have heterogeneous capabilities and may have an incentive to collude in order to deceive the platform. The platform itself may have incomplete information regarding the workers’ capabilities, which it could attempt to learn over time. Furthermore, there may be asymmetries in the information available to the platform and to the workers. We will survey approaches to dealing with such problems using game-theoretical and online learning-based approaches.

源语言英语
主期刊名Wireless Networks (United Kingdom)
出版商Springer Nature
117-140
页数24
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 2023

出版系列

姓名Wireless Networks (United Kingdom)
Part F1100
ISSN(印刷版)2366-1186
ISSN(电子版)2366-1445

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引用此

Huang, C., Yu, H., Huang, J., & Berry, R. (2023). Incentive Mechanism Design for Mobile Crowdsourcing Without Verification. 在 Wireless Networks (United Kingdom) (页码 117-140). (Wireless Networks (United Kingdom); 卷 Part F1100). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32397-3_5