TY - GEN
T1 - First- and second-price sealed-bid auctions applied to private parking slot sharing
AU - Tan, Bingqing
AU - Kang, Kai
AU - Xu, Suxiu
AU - Qu, Ting
AU - Li, Congdong
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 IEEE.
PY - 2018/5/18
Y1 - 2018/5/18
N2 - This paper combines market design theory and sequential auction to settle the problem of parking space sharing and allocation in metropolitan areas during normal working hours. Firstly, a market mechanism, the PC-TTCC (price-compatible top trading cycles and chains) mechanism, is introduced to share private parking slots among agents. And after exchanging private parking slots that are fail to exchange are leased to the platform. Based on the historical auction price with weight, the platform pay the agents who offer their private parking slots. The platform manages these private parking slots and some public parking slots at the same time. Then, two auction mechanisms, the first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions mechanisms, are proposed to reallocate the parking slots received from agents and owned by platform cross the platform. In this paper, the PC-TTCC mechanism with rule e (PC-TTCC [e]) and first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions are effective. This work will contribute to the further research of the solutions in private parking slot sharing.
AB - This paper combines market design theory and sequential auction to settle the problem of parking space sharing and allocation in metropolitan areas during normal working hours. Firstly, a market mechanism, the PC-TTCC (price-compatible top trading cycles and chains) mechanism, is introduced to share private parking slots among agents. And after exchanging private parking slots that are fail to exchange are leased to the platform. Based on the historical auction price with weight, the platform pay the agents who offer their private parking slots. The platform manages these private parking slots and some public parking slots at the same time. Then, two auction mechanisms, the first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions mechanisms, are proposed to reallocate the parking slots received from agents and owned by platform cross the platform. In this paper, the PC-TTCC mechanism with rule e (PC-TTCC [e]) and first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions are effective. This work will contribute to the further research of the solutions in private parking slot sharing.
KW - Historical auction prices
KW - Mechanism design
KW - Private parking slot sharing and allocation
KW - Sequential auction
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85048233192&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ICNSC.2018.8361317
DO - 10.1109/ICNSC.2018.8361317
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85048233192
T3 - ICNSC 2018 - 15th IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control
SP - 1
EP - 5
BT - ICNSC 2018 - 15th IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 15th IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control, ICNSC 2018
Y2 - 27 March 2018 through 29 March 2018
ER -
