Evolutionary game analysis of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain with asymmetric information

Jian Li, Weihao Du, Fengmei Yang, Guowei Hua*

*此作品的通讯作者

科研成果: 期刊稿件文章同行评审

30 引用 (Scopus)

摘要

Remanufacturing is an effective means to realize energy saving and emission reduction. This paper develops an evolutionary game model with a two-echelon closed-loop supply chain to study evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of manufacturers and retailers. Through analyzing evolutionary path of the game, we find that there are two possible evolutionary results affected by the profits of manufacturers. Price of remanufacturing products may be a critical factor that determines the ESS. Government subsidy is critical to promote the development of remanufacturing industry.

源语言英语
页(从-至)6312-6324
页数13
期刊Sustainability (Switzerland)
6
9
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 2014
已对外发布

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