Diversity of payment contracts in a decentralized assembly system

Guo Li, Mengqi Liu, Xu Guan*

*此作品的通讯作者

    科研成果: 期刊稿件文章同行评审

    4 引用 (Scopus)

    摘要

    Conventional wisdom views that in an assembly system, suppliers have to accept a unified payment contract when transacting with a manufacturer. However, in practice, the implementation of a payment contract is clearly more dependent on the channel power of the supplier in the supply chain. This paper considers an assembly system consisting of two suppliers with different channel powers, and identifies three payment contracts, namely, on-delivery payment, on-agreed-time payment, and ready-to-assemble payment. We investigate the equilibrium delivery and timing decisions of firms under three different cases distinguished by the combinations of different payment contracts in the system. Based on both theoretical and quantitative analyses, three major results are obtained. First, the delivery times of suppliers are cost-driven and time-related. Second, the buffer time of the manufacturer can balance the production lead times of the supplier. Third, the supply chain achieves the lowest cost when the core supplier chooses an on-agreed-time payment contract, and the general supplier adopts a ready-to-assemble payment contract.

    源语言英语
    页(从-至)613-639
    页数27
    期刊Annals of Operations Research
    257
    1-2
    DOI
    出版状态已出版 - 1 10月 2017

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