A Blockchain-Based Storage System with Financial Incentives for Load-balancing

Hao Yin, Zijian Zhang, Liehuang Zhu*, Meng Li, Xiaojiang Du, Mohsen Guizani, Bakh Khoussainov

*此作品的通讯作者

科研成果: 期刊稿件文章同行评审

12 引用 (Scopus)

摘要

Most storage systems adopt distributed architecture to reach high reliability. In these distributed systems, a well-balanced data distribution can improve storage reliability. However, existing schemes rely on dealers to distribute data, bring back the risk of single-point failure again. In this paper, we propose a blockchain-based storage system with financial incentives for load-balancing. Nodes in the system are rational and compete for data to earn a reward. The only source of storage rewards is from users' payment for leasing storage. To reach load-balancing, we design a new incentive scheme, which contains an income function to reward the nodes who own proper data and punish the nodes who own excessive data. In the system, each node continuously generates a proof of storage. We present a chain structure using the proofs to detect node failures and record data distribution. The state of distribution could be taken as input to the income function for reward allocation. We decouple the role of nodes from miners to reduce their workload, making the system more compatible. Our simulation experiments show efficient performance in the data distribution. The system can always recover to a balanced status as the blockchain grows up.

源语言英语
文章编号9244580
页(从-至)1178-1188
页数11
期刊IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
8
2
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 1 4月 2021

指纹

探究 'A Blockchain-Based Storage System with Financial Incentives for Load-balancing' 的科研主题。它们共同构成独一无二的指纹。

引用此