TY - JOUR
T1 - Waveguide Eavesdropping Threat for Terahertz Wireless Communications
AU - Liu, Wenbo
AU - Li, Peian
AU - Meng, Xiangzhu
AU - Zhao, Liangbin
AU - Qiao, Yige
AU - Gao, Xiang
AU - Ma, Jianjun
AU - Sun, Houjun
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 1979-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2024/2/1
Y1 - 2024/2/1
N2 - As wireless communications move to higher frequency band for 5G networks and beyond, resiliency against eavesdropping and other security threats is still one of the key system design considerations. Compared to data transmissions by lower frequencies, terahertz links are inherently more robust against eavesdropping attacks due to their propagation characteristics (e.g., high free-space path loss) and aligned link path by high-gain antennas. However, it does not indicate that eavesdropping is always impossible. Line-of-sight terahertz links have proven to be vulnerable to active/passive eavesdroppers by placing scatterers in the path of data transmission, or by collecting side-lobe leakages. Here, we demonstrate a wave-guide-based approach for signal eavesdropping that can be operated much more feasibly with several advantages, such as lower propagation loss and reliable data interception. Our method relies on a 3D printed rectangular dielectric waveguide and can overcome spatial limitations caused by directional modulation or near-field modulation. We demonstrate successful eavesdropping attacks for a 16-QAM data link at rates up to 5 Gb/s. Our work highlights the importance of system designs in resisting waveguide-based eavesdropping strategies and identifies aspects where the physical-layer security technique needs to be strengthened.
AB - As wireless communications move to higher frequency band for 5G networks and beyond, resiliency against eavesdropping and other security threats is still one of the key system design considerations. Compared to data transmissions by lower frequencies, terahertz links are inherently more robust against eavesdropping attacks due to their propagation characteristics (e.g., high free-space path loss) and aligned link path by high-gain antennas. However, it does not indicate that eavesdropping is always impossible. Line-of-sight terahertz links have proven to be vulnerable to active/passive eavesdroppers by placing scatterers in the path of data transmission, or by collecting side-lobe leakages. Here, we demonstrate a wave-guide-based approach for signal eavesdropping that can be operated much more feasibly with several advantages, such as lower propagation loss and reliable data interception. Our method relies on a 3D printed rectangular dielectric waveguide and can overcome spatial limitations caused by directional modulation or near-field modulation. We demonstrate successful eavesdropping attacks for a 16-QAM data link at rates up to 5 Gb/s. Our work highlights the importance of system designs in resisting waveguide-based eavesdropping strategies and identifies aspects where the physical-layer security technique needs to be strengthened.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85142782959&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/MCOM.001.2200410
DO - 10.1109/MCOM.001.2200410
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85142782959
SN - 0163-6804
VL - 62
SP - 80
EP - 84
JO - IEEE Communications Magazine
JF - IEEE Communications Magazine
IS - 2
ER -