Truthful Mechanisms for Steiner Tree Problems

Jinshan Zhang, Zhengyang Liu*, Xiaotie Deng, Jianwei Yin

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Consider an undirected graph G = (V, E) model for a communication network, where each edge is owned by a selfish agent, who reports the cost for offering the use of her edge. Note that each edge agent may misreport her own cost for the use of the edge for her own benefit. In such a non-cooperative setting, we aim at designing an approximately truthful mechanism for establishing a Steiner tree, a minimum cost tree spanning over all the terminals. We present a truthful-in-expectation mechanism that achieves the approximation ratio ln 4 + ϵ ≈ 1.39, which matches the current best algorithmic ratio for STP.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAAAI-23 Technical Tracks 5
EditorsBrian Williams, Yiling Chen, Jennifer Neville
PublisherAAAI press
Pages5884-5891
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9781577358800
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 27 Jun 2023
Event37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2023 - Washington, United States
Duration: 7 Feb 202314 Feb 2023

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2023
Volume37

Conference

Conference37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2023
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityWashington
Period7/02/2314/02/23

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