TY - JOUR
T1 - Toward efficient waste electric vehicle battery recycling via auction-based market trading mechanisms
AU - Xu, Su Xiu
AU - Feng, Jianghong
AU - Huang, George Q.
AU - Zhai, Yue
AU - Cheng, Meng
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - This paper proposes an auction-based market trade mechanism for the electric vehicle battery recycling (EVBR) problem, which aims to realise the optimal resource allocation and pricing of EVBR. The main motivation of this paper is to attempt to explore an approach to achieving efficient battery recycling. We first consider an EVBR market with m buyers and n sellers, and develop the multi-unit trade reduction (MTR) mechanism in the EVBR market. According to the supply and demand relationship in the EVBR market, we consider three market scenarios of supply and demand balance, oversupply, and overdemand, and formulated corresponding auction allocation rules. Numerical study results show that the proposed MTR mechanism can achieve efficient resource allocation. We also observed that not all results increased with the number of sellers/buyers. Second, considering the distance between sellers and buyers, we developed a stochastic multiple MTR (SM-MTR) mechanism to enable sellers and buyers within the region to conduct transactions. Finally, we propose an integrated MTR, SM-MTR and one-sided Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction mechanism that is feasible in both one-sided and bilateral environments. Furthermore, our work can provide novel managerial implications for EVBR market stakeholders in terms of practical application.
AB - This paper proposes an auction-based market trade mechanism for the electric vehicle battery recycling (EVBR) problem, which aims to realise the optimal resource allocation and pricing of EVBR. The main motivation of this paper is to attempt to explore an approach to achieving efficient battery recycling. We first consider an EVBR market with m buyers and n sellers, and develop the multi-unit trade reduction (MTR) mechanism in the EVBR market. According to the supply and demand relationship in the EVBR market, we consider three market scenarios of supply and demand balance, oversupply, and overdemand, and formulated corresponding auction allocation rules. Numerical study results show that the proposed MTR mechanism can achieve efficient resource allocation. We also observed that not all results increased with the number of sellers/buyers. Second, considering the distance between sellers and buyers, we developed a stochastic multiple MTR (SM-MTR) mechanism to enable sellers and buyers within the region to conduct transactions. Finally, we propose an integrated MTR, SM-MTR and one-sided Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction mechanism that is feasible in both one-sided and bilateral environments. Furthermore, our work can provide novel managerial implications for EVBR market stakeholders in terms of practical application.
KW - Double auction
KW - electric vehicle battery recycling
KW - incentive compatibility
KW - market trade mechanism
KW - mechanism design
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85145362969&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/00207543.2022.2157904
DO - 10.1080/00207543.2022.2157904
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85145362969
SN - 0020-7543
VL - 61
SP - 8598
EP - 8617
JO - International Journal of Production Research
JF - International Journal of Production Research
IS - 24
ER -