TY - JOUR
T1 - Suppressing partner opportunism in emerging markets
T2 - Contextualizing institutional forces in supply chain management
AU - Yang, Defeng
AU - Sheng, Shibin
AU - Wu, Shuilong
AU - Zhou, Kevin Zheng
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2018/9
Y1 - 2018/9
N2 - Drawing on the literature of supply chain opportunism and institutional theory, this study examines the confluence of institutional and efficiency views to assess how institutional forces restrain the impact of exchange hazards (i.e., transaction-specific assets and performance ambiguity) on supply chain opportunism. We predict that legal enforceability and guanxi importance mitigate supply chain opportunism, but their interaction does not necessarily help to curb opportunism. In addition, we propose that legal enforceability and guanxi importance have differential moderating effects on the relationships between exchange hazards and opportunism. The empirical analyses of a dyadic buyer-supplier dataset in China confirm the predicted direct and interactive effects of the institutional forces. In addition, the positive impact of transaction-specific assets on opportunism is attenuated by legal enforceability but not by guanxi importance, whereas the effect of performance ambiguity decreases due to guanxi importance but not legal enforceability.
AB - Drawing on the literature of supply chain opportunism and institutional theory, this study examines the confluence of institutional and efficiency views to assess how institutional forces restrain the impact of exchange hazards (i.e., transaction-specific assets and performance ambiguity) on supply chain opportunism. We predict that legal enforceability and guanxi importance mitigate supply chain opportunism, but their interaction does not necessarily help to curb opportunism. In addition, we propose that legal enforceability and guanxi importance have differential moderating effects on the relationships between exchange hazards and opportunism. The empirical analyses of a dyadic buyer-supplier dataset in China confirm the predicted direct and interactive effects of the institutional forces. In addition, the positive impact of transaction-specific assets on opportunism is attenuated by legal enforceability but not by guanxi importance, whereas the effect of performance ambiguity decreases due to guanxi importance but not legal enforceability.
KW - Exchange hazards
KW - Guanxi importance
KW - Institutional theory
KW - Legal enforceability
KW - Opportunism
KW - Transaction cost economics
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85046438799&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.04.037
DO - 10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.04.037
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85046438799
SN - 0148-2963
VL - 90
SP - 1
EP - 13
JO - Journal of Business Research
JF - Journal of Business Research
ER -