Supply chain contracts for quality investment incentives

Fang Xu; Jian Li; Fengmei Yang

doi:10.1109/CSO.2012.167

Supply chain contracts for quality investment incentives

Fang Xu, Jian Li^*, Fengmei Yang

^*Corresponding author for this work

Beijing University of Chemical Technology

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

This paper investigates contracts for quality investment incentives in a supply chain consisting of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a contractmanufacturer (CM) with price- and quality-sensitive demand. The OEM outsources the production to the CM who invests to guarantee quality, while the OEM is responsible for product sales and product pricing. We analyze their individual optimal strategies under three types of contract, i.e., a wholesale price contract, a revenue sharing contract, and a cost sharing contract. We also explore the best contract from the perspective of the whole supply chain performance.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 2012 5th International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization, CSO 2012
Pages	733-736
Number of pages	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CSO.2012.167
Publication status	Published - 2012
Externally published	Yes
Event	2012 5th International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization, CSO 2012 - Harbin, Heilongjiang, China Duration: 23 Jun 2012 → 26 Jun 2012

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the 2012 5th International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization, CSO 2012

Conference

Conference	2012 5th International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization, CSO 2012
Country/Territory	China
City	Harbin, Heilongjiang
Period	23/06/12 → 26/06/12

Keywords

Cost sharing contract
Quality investment
Revenue sharing contract
Wholesale price contract

Access to Document

10.1109/CSO.2012.167

Cite this

Xu, F., Li, J., & Yang, F. (2012). Supply chain contracts for quality investment incentives. In Proceedings of the 2012 5th International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization, CSO 2012 (pp. 733-736). Article 6274829 (Proceedings of the 2012 5th International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization, CSO 2012). https://doi.org/10.1109/CSO.2012.167

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title = "Supply chain contracts for quality investment incentives",

abstract = "This paper investigates contracts for quality investment incentives in a supply chain consisting of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a contractmanufacturer (CM) with price- and quality-sensitive demand. The OEM outsources the production to the CM who invests to guarantee quality, while the OEM is responsible for product sales and product pricing. We analyze their individual optimal strategies under three types of contract, i.e., a wholesale price contract, a revenue sharing contract, and a cost sharing contract. We also explore the best contract from the perspective of the whole supply chain performance.",

keywords = "Cost sharing contract, Quality investment, Revenue sharing contract, Wholesale price contract",

author = "Fang Xu and Jian Li and Fengmei Yang",

year = "2012",

doi = "10.1109/CSO.2012.167",

language = "English",

isbn = "9780769546902",

series = "Proceedings of the 2012 5th International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization, CSO 2012",

pages = "733--736",

booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2012 5th International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization, CSO 2012",

note = "2012 5th International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization, CSO 2012 ; Conference date: 23-06-2012 Through 26-06-2012",

}

Xu, F, Li, J & Yang, F 2012, Supply chain contracts for quality investment incentives. in Proceedings of the 2012 5th International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization, CSO 2012., 6274829, Proceedings of the 2012 5th International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization, CSO 2012, pp. 733-736, 2012 5th International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization, CSO 2012, Harbin, Heilongjiang, China, 23/06/12. https://doi.org/10.1109/CSO.2012.167

Supply chain contracts for quality investment incentives. / Xu, Fang; Li, Jian; Yang, Fengmei.
Proceedings of the 2012 5th International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization, CSO 2012. 2012. p. 733-736 6274829 (Proceedings of the 2012 5th International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization, CSO 2012).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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ER -

Supply chain contracts for quality investment incentives

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Keywords

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