Residual vector analysis method (RVAM) for evaluating the performance of GNSS Part of Channels' replay attacks

GNSS receivers are vulnerable to replay attacks. Main of previous works suppose all visible GNSS satellites' signals are manipulated by repeaters, which launch replay attacks, and a victim GNSS receiver processes spoofing signals but not legitimate signals. However, in navigation confrontation environment, the supposing is quite difficult to meet. To this end, here a more practicable scenario called RAPC, which represents Replay Attacks based on Parts of Channels and means both spoofing signals and legitimate signals are processed by a GNSS receiver, is considered. In order to evaluate the performance of RAPC on manipulating a GNSS receiver's position, which is the base for high-efficient spoofing and anti-spoofing, a residual vector analysis method (RVAM) is proposed in the paper. In the method, according to the desired position, current GNSS constellation, and the positions of repeaters, a set of linear measurement equations are built, which associate with PVT solutions and residual vector, and are used to choose satellite signals to be spoofed and make delays on the spoofed signals. The precision of RVAM is analyzed as well. Theoretical and simulation results demonstrate the validity of the method.