On the approximation of nash equilibria in sparse win-lose games

Zhengyang Liu, Ying Sheng

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We show that the problem of finding an approximate Nash equilibrium with a polynomial precision is PPAD-hard even for two-player sparse win-lose games (i.e., games with {0, 1}-entries such that each row and column of the two n×n payoff matrices have at most O(log n) many ones). The proof is mainly based on a new class of prototype games called Chasing Games, which we think is of independent interest in understanding the complexity of Nash equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018
PublisherAAAI press
Pages1154-1160
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9781577358008
Publication statusPublished - 2018
Externally publishedYes
Event32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018 - New Orleans, United States
Duration: 2 Feb 20187 Feb 2018

Publication series

Name32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018

Conference

Conference32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNew Orleans
Period2/02/187/02/18

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