Game-based valley-fill charging coordination for large-population plug-in electric vehicles

Zhongjing Ma*, Long Ran

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Charging coordination of large-population autonomous plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) in the power grid can be formulated as a class of constrained optimization problems. To overcome the computational complexity, a game-based method is proposed for the charging problems of the PEV population, which is composed of homogeneous subpopulations, such that individuals update their best charging strategies simultaneously with respect to a common electricity price determined by the total demand. To mitigate the oscillation behavior caused by the greedy behavior for the cheap electricity by individuals, a deviation cost is introduced to penalize against the deviation of the individual strategy from the average value of the homogeneous subpopulation. By adopting a proper deviation cost and following a best strategy update mechanism, the game systems may converge to the socially optimal valley-fill Nash equilibrium. Simulation examples are studied to illustrate the results.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2010-2018
Number of pages9
JournalAsian Journal of Control
Volume17
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sept 2015

Keywords

  • Nash equilibrium
  • Non-cooperative game
  • Plug-in electric vehicles
  • Valley-fill

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Ma, Z., & Ran, L. (2015). Game-based valley-fill charging coordination for large-population plug-in electric vehicles. Asian Journal of Control, 17(5), 2010-2018. https://doi.org/10.1002/asjc.1054