Credibility-based cooperative fuzzy game with Choquet integral form

Lun Ran*, Jinhui Pang, Pengfei Bai

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper, we advance an argument on the fuzzy game which was introduced by Tsurumi and Tanino. Fuzzy coalition can be considered as the rates of players' participation to the coalition. We define the participation rates as fuzzy variables to denote the available vagueness information. First, a new concept of payoff function was given from the Choquet integral fuzzy measure point of view, and a new type of fuzzy game was provided to extend the fuzzy game definition. Second, when the players want to maximize the optimistic return at a predetermined confidence level, the payoff function was discussed in detail by credibility measure. Third, a credibility maximization model was developed to meet the different optimistic levels. Finally, we give a numerical example to show the rational property of obtained payoff for fuzzy coalition.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2009 IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Computing and Intelligent Systems, ICIS 2009
Pages537-541
Number of pages5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009
Event2009 IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Computing and Intelligent Systems, ICIS 2009 - Shanghai, China
Duration: 20 Nov 200922 Nov 2009

Publication series

NameProceedings - 2009 IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Computing and Intelligent Systems, ICIS 2009
Volume4

Conference

Conference2009 IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Computing and Intelligent Systems, ICIS 2009
Country/TerritoryChina
CityShanghai
Period20/11/0922/11/09

Keywords

  • Fuzzy coalition
  • Fuzzy programming
  • Payoff function
  • The Choquet integral
  • The credibility measure

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