Covert attacks against output tracking control of cyber-physical systems

Fangyuan Hou, Jian Sun*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the problem of designing successful covert attacks against output tracking control of cyber-physical systems from the covert agent's angle. Based on the perfect model knowledge and no model knowledge, the covert agent designs two kinds of covert attacks which can compromise the output tracking control system without being detected. Two sufficient conditions under which the covert agent can successfully compromise the output tracking control system are proposed. The designed covert attacks are illustrated through two numerical examples.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings IECON 2017 - 43rd Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages5743-5748
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781538611272
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 15 Dec 2017
Event43rd Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society, IECON 2017 - Beijing, China
Duration: 29 Oct 20171 Nov 2017

Publication series

NameProceedings IECON 2017 - 43rd Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society
Volume2017-January

Conference

Conference43rd Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society, IECON 2017
Country/TerritoryChina
CityBeijing
Period29/10/171/11/17

Keywords

  • covert attacks
  • cyber-physical systems
  • no model knowledge

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