TY - GEN
T1 - Cooperation in delay tolerant networks
AU - Yin, Lei
AU - Lu, Hui Mei
AU - Cao, Yuan Da
AU - Gao, Jian Min
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - In delay tolerant networks (DTNs), all the networking functions rely on the contribution of the participants to fulfill the store-and-forward fashion. Since wireless nodes are buffer and energy constrained, it may not be in the best interest of a node to always accept relay request. In recent years, incentive mechanisms have been proposed to stimulate nodes to cooperate in packet forwarding. However, the lack of end-to-end paths, high variation and long feedback delay in DTNs imply that existing solutions for mobile ad-hoc networks do not apply to DTNs. In this paper, we address the problem assuming that nodes are rational to optimize self interest. We propose a model, named Pay-for-Gain (PFG), based on game theory and loan-credit theory, to investigate equilibrium point that maximizes their own interest. For comparison, the strategy tit-for-tat (TFT) and PFG are tested in existing routing protocols in DTNs.
AB - In delay tolerant networks (DTNs), all the networking functions rely on the contribution of the participants to fulfill the store-and-forward fashion. Since wireless nodes are buffer and energy constrained, it may not be in the best interest of a node to always accept relay request. In recent years, incentive mechanisms have been proposed to stimulate nodes to cooperate in packet forwarding. However, the lack of end-to-end paths, high variation and long feedback delay in DTNs imply that existing solutions for mobile ad-hoc networks do not apply to DTNs. In this paper, we address the problem assuming that nodes are rational to optimize self interest. We propose a model, named Pay-for-Gain (PFG), based on game theory and loan-credit theory, to investigate equilibrium point that maximizes their own interest. For comparison, the strategy tit-for-tat (TFT) and PFG are tested in existing routing protocols in DTNs.
KW - Cooperation
KW - DTN
KW - Equilibrium
KW - Incentive mechanism
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77957256338&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ICSPS.2010.5555572
DO - 10.1109/ICSPS.2010.5555572
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:77957256338
SN - 9781424468911
T3 - ICSPS 2010 - Proceedings of the 2010 2nd International Conference on Signal Processing Systems
SP - V1202-V1205
BT - ICSPS 2010 - Proceedings of the 2010 2nd International Conference on Signal Processing Systems
T2 - 2010 2nd International Conference on Signal Processing Systems, ICSPS 2010
Y2 - 5 July 2010 through 7 July 2010
ER -