TY - JOUR
T1 - Contract Design for Time Resource Assignment and Pricing in Backscatter-Assisted RF-Powered Networks
AU - Gao, Xiaozheng
AU - Niyato, Dusit
AU - Wang, Ping
AU - Yang, Kai
AU - An, Jianping
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2012 IEEE.
PY - 2020/1
Y1 - 2020/1
N2 - Backscatter communication has been acknowledged as an essential supplement to improve the performance of radio-frequency-powered networks. Considering the fact that the backscatter communication needs the cooperation from the secondary gateway, pricing is an effective method to incentivize the secondary gateway to take part in the backscatter communication. In this letter, we consider a practical scenario, where the secondary gateway only knows the statistical information about the harvested power of the secondary transmitter, and develop a time resource assignment and pricing scheme for the network based on contract theory. Specifically, the secondary gateway designs a contract, including a series of time-price items, to maximize its profit. Then, the secondary transmitter accepts the contract item which can maximize its utility. We derive the optimal contract, which guarantees the incentive compatibility and the individual rationality properties. Numerical results are presented to verify the effectiveness of our designed contract.
AB - Backscatter communication has been acknowledged as an essential supplement to improve the performance of radio-frequency-powered networks. Considering the fact that the backscatter communication needs the cooperation from the secondary gateway, pricing is an effective method to incentivize the secondary gateway to take part in the backscatter communication. In this letter, we consider a practical scenario, where the secondary gateway only knows the statistical information about the harvested power of the secondary transmitter, and develop a time resource assignment and pricing scheme for the network based on contract theory. Specifically, the secondary gateway designs a contract, including a series of time-price items, to maximize its profit. Then, the secondary transmitter accepts the contract item which can maximize its utility. We derive the optimal contract, which guarantees the incentive compatibility and the individual rationality properties. Numerical results are presented to verify the effectiveness of our designed contract.
KW - Backscatter communications
KW - contract theory
KW - energy harvesting
KW - pricing
KW - time resource assignment
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85078437933&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/LWC.2019.2940942
DO - 10.1109/LWC.2019.2940942
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85078437933
SN - 2162-2337
VL - 9
SP - 42
EP - 46
JO - IEEE Wireless Communications Letters
JF - IEEE Wireless Communications Letters
IS - 1
M1 - 8834802
ER -