Abstract
Driven by technology and the demand for charging, consumers will consider the vehicle quality and the number of charging stations when purchasing electric vehicles (EVs). This paper investigates the effects of the vehicle quality gap and the compatibility ratio of charging stations under a competitive strategy and a coopetition strategy. We develop the Hotelling model that captures manufacturers' decisions. Interestingly, we find that a coopetition strategy is chosen when the vehicle quality gap is smaller, or when the quality gap is medium and the compatibility ratio of charging stations is larger for the high-end vehicles manufacturer. Manufacturers and the government can achieve a win-win situation in a coopetition strategy, but consumer surplus is always the lowest in this strategy. In the extension model, we find a larger upgrade cost leads to a decrease in the number of charging stations and an increase in revenue for both manufacturers. The charging service fee affects only the EV price under a competitive strategy and affects both the EV price and the manufacturers' profits under a coopetition strategy over a certain time. The coopetition relationship between manufacturers changes the supply chain structure, guiding the development of EVs and charging stations.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 103830 |
Journal | Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services |
Volume | 79 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jul 2024 |
Keywords
- Charging station
- Coopetition strategy
- Electric vehicle (EV) charging compatibility
- Game theory
- Vehicle quality gap