TY - GEN
T1 - An Incentive Mechanism Design for Efficient Edge Learning by Deep Reinforcement Learning Approach
AU - Zhan, Yufeng
AU - Zhang, Jiang
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 IEEE.
PY - 2020/7
Y1 - 2020/7
N2 - Emerging technologies and applications have generated large amounts of data at the network edge. Due to bandwidth, storage, and privacy concerns, it is often impractical to move the collected data to the cloud. With the rapid development of edge computing and distributed machine learning (ML), edge-based ML called federated learning has emerged to overcome the shortcomings of cloud-based ML. Existing works mainly focus on designing efficient learning algorithms, few works focus on designing the incentive mechanisms with heterogeneous edge nodes (EN) and uncertainty of network bandwidth. The incentive mechanisms affect various tradeoffs: (i) between computation and communication latency, and thus (ii) between the edge learning time and payment consumption. We fill this gap by designing an incentive mechanism that captures the tradeoff between latency and payment. Due to the network dynamics and privacy protection, we propose a deep reinforcement learning-based (DRL-based) solution that can automatically learn the best pricing strategy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that applies the advances of DRL to design the incentive mechanism for edge learning. We evaluate the performance of the incentive mechanism using trace-driven experiments. The results demonstrate the superiority of our proposed approach as compared with the baselines.
AB - Emerging technologies and applications have generated large amounts of data at the network edge. Due to bandwidth, storage, and privacy concerns, it is often impractical to move the collected data to the cloud. With the rapid development of edge computing and distributed machine learning (ML), edge-based ML called federated learning has emerged to overcome the shortcomings of cloud-based ML. Existing works mainly focus on designing efficient learning algorithms, few works focus on designing the incentive mechanisms with heterogeneous edge nodes (EN) and uncertainty of network bandwidth. The incentive mechanisms affect various tradeoffs: (i) between computation and communication latency, and thus (ii) between the edge learning time and payment consumption. We fill this gap by designing an incentive mechanism that captures the tradeoff between latency and payment. Due to the network dynamics and privacy protection, we propose a deep reinforcement learning-based (DRL-based) solution that can automatically learn the best pricing strategy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that applies the advances of DRL to design the incentive mechanism for edge learning. We evaluate the performance of the incentive mechanism using trace-driven experiments. The results demonstrate the superiority of our proposed approach as compared with the baselines.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85090298024&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/INFOCOM41043.2020.9155268
DO - 10.1109/INFOCOM41043.2020.9155268
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85090298024
T3 - Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
SP - 2489
EP - 2498
BT - INFOCOM 2020 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 38th IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2020
Y2 - 6 July 2020 through 9 July 2020
ER -