Suppressing partner opportunism in emerging markets: Contextualizing institutional forces in supply chain management

Defeng Yang, Shibin Sheng, Shuilong Wu*, Kevin Zheng Zhou

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    54 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Drawing on the literature of supply chain opportunism and institutional theory, this study examines the confluence of institutional and efficiency views to assess how institutional forces restrain the impact of exchange hazards (i.e., transaction-specific assets and performance ambiguity) on supply chain opportunism. We predict that legal enforceability and guanxi importance mitigate supply chain opportunism, but their interaction does not necessarily help to curb opportunism. In addition, we propose that legal enforceability and guanxi importance have differential moderating effects on the relationships between exchange hazards and opportunism. The empirical analyses of a dyadic buyer-supplier dataset in China confirm the predicted direct and interactive effects of the institutional forces. In addition, the positive impact of transaction-specific assets on opportunism is attenuated by legal enforceability but not by guanxi importance, whereas the effect of performance ambiguity decreases due to guanxi importance but not legal enforceability.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1-13
    Number of pages13
    JournalJournal of Business Research
    Volume90
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Sept 2018

    Keywords

    • Exchange hazards
    • Guanxi importance
    • Institutional theory
    • Legal enforceability
    • Opportunism
    • Transaction cost economics

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