TY - JOUR
T1 - Sequential auction based parking space sharing and pricing mechanism in the era of sharing economy
AU - Tan, Bing Qing
AU - Xu, Su Xiu
AU - Zhong, Ray
AU - Cheng, Meng
AU - Kang, Kai
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Emerald Publishing Limited.
PY - 2019/9/19
Y1 - 2019/9/19
N2 - Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to design a parking space management platform to alleviate the parking problem and a two-stage solution for sharing and allocating parking spaces. Design/methodology/approach: The market design mechanism and auction mechanism are integrated to solve the problem of parking space sharing and allocation. In the first stage, the market design mechanism with two rules is applied for making the good use of idle parking spaces. In the second stage, two sequential auction mechanisms are designed by extending first/second-price sealed bid auction mechanism to allocate both private and public parking spaces, which are received in previous stage and owned by the platform. Two stages are connected through a forecasted price which is calculated through the exponential smoothing method. Findings: First, we prove three important properties of the proposed sequential auction mechanisms, namely, incentive compatibility, revenue equivalence and individual rationality. Second, a simulation study is used to verify the effectiveness of the mechanisms through numerical analysis. The impact of the system on three parts, namely, agents (private parking space suppliers), bidders (parking space customers) and the platform, is examined. Third, the results show that the sharing mechanism with monetrary incentive will attract a number of agents to join in the platform. The bidders are also able to obtain considerable utility, as compared with the (average) market parking fees. The platform can thus effectively allocate parking spaces with reasonable prices. Originality/value: This paper combines the classical sequential auction mechanisms with the market design mechanism for the parking space sharing and allocation problem. The modeling and analysis method can also be used to address the similar allocation and pricing problems of other resources like bicycle sharing.
AB - Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to design a parking space management platform to alleviate the parking problem and a two-stage solution for sharing and allocating parking spaces. Design/methodology/approach: The market design mechanism and auction mechanism are integrated to solve the problem of parking space sharing and allocation. In the first stage, the market design mechanism with two rules is applied for making the good use of idle parking spaces. In the second stage, two sequential auction mechanisms are designed by extending first/second-price sealed bid auction mechanism to allocate both private and public parking spaces, which are received in previous stage and owned by the platform. Two stages are connected through a forecasted price which is calculated through the exponential smoothing method. Findings: First, we prove three important properties of the proposed sequential auction mechanisms, namely, incentive compatibility, revenue equivalence and individual rationality. Second, a simulation study is used to verify the effectiveness of the mechanisms through numerical analysis. The impact of the system on three parts, namely, agents (private parking space suppliers), bidders (parking space customers) and the platform, is examined. Third, the results show that the sharing mechanism with monetrary incentive will attract a number of agents to join in the platform. The bidders are also able to obtain considerable utility, as compared with the (average) market parking fees. The platform can thus effectively allocate parking spaces with reasonable prices. Originality/value: This paper combines the classical sequential auction mechanisms with the market design mechanism for the parking space sharing and allocation problem. The modeling and analysis method can also be used to address the similar allocation and pricing problems of other resources like bicycle sharing.
KW - Market design theory
KW - Parking space allocation
KW - Sequential auction
KW - Sharing economy
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85074194880&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1108/IMDS-04-2019-0244
DO - 10.1108/IMDS-04-2019-0244
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85074194880
SN - 0263-5577
VL - 119
SP - 1734
EP - 1747
JO - Industrial Management and Data Systems
JF - Industrial Management and Data Systems
IS - 8
ER -