Abstract
Many retailers diversify their supply disruption risk by sourcing from multiple suppliers. While a retailer's sourcing strategy impacts the profit of the supply chain, the pricing strategies of suppliers influence all aspects of the supply chain. In this paper we investigate the sourcing strategy of a retailer and the pricing strategies of two suppliers in a supply chain under an environment of supply disruption. We characterize the sourcing strategies of the retailer in a centralized and a decentralized system. We derive a sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium price in the decentralized system when the suppliers are competitive. Based on the assumption of a uniform demand distribution, we obtain an explicit form of the solutions when the suppliers are competitive. Finally we devise a coordination mechanism to maximize the profits of both suppliers.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 137-150 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | International Journal of Production Economics |
Volume | 124 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Mar 2010 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Cooperation game
- Non-cooperation game
- Supply chain coordination
- Supply disruption