TY - JOUR
T1 - Pricing for Collaboration between Online Apps and Offline Venues
AU - Yu, Haoran
AU - Iosifidis, George
AU - Shou, Biying
AU - Huang, Jianwei
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2002-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2020/6/1
Y1 - 2020/6/1
N2 - An increasing number of mobile applications (abbrev. apps), like Pokemon Go and Snapchat, reward the users who physically visit some locations tagged as POIs (places-of-interest) by the apps. We study the novel POI-based collaboration between apps and venues (e.g., restaurants). On the one hand, an app charges a venue and tags the venue as a POI. The POI tag motivates users to visit the venue, which potentially increases the venue's sales. On the other hand, the venue can invest in the app-related infrastructure, which enables more users to use the app and further benefits the app's business. The apps' existing POI tariffs cannot fully incentivize the venue's infrastructure investment, and hence cannot lead to the most effective app-venue collaboration. We design an optimal two-part tariff, which charges the venue for becoming a POI, and subsidizes the venue every time a user interacts with the POI. The subsidy design efficiently incentivizes the venue's infrastructure investment, and we prove that our tariff achieves the highest app's revenue among a general class of tariffs. Furthermore, we derive some counter-intuitive guidelines for the POI-based collaboration. For example, a bandwidth-consuming app should collaborate with a low-quality venue (users have low utilities when consuming the venue's products).
AB - An increasing number of mobile applications (abbrev. apps), like Pokemon Go and Snapchat, reward the users who physically visit some locations tagged as POIs (places-of-interest) by the apps. We study the novel POI-based collaboration between apps and venues (e.g., restaurants). On the one hand, an app charges a venue and tags the venue as a POI. The POI tag motivates users to visit the venue, which potentially increases the venue's sales. On the other hand, the venue can invest in the app-related infrastructure, which enables more users to use the app and further benefits the app's business. The apps' existing POI tariffs cannot fully incentivize the venue's infrastructure investment, and hence cannot lead to the most effective app-venue collaboration. We design an optimal two-part tariff, which charges the venue for becoming a POI, and subsidizes the venue every time a user interacts with the POI. The subsidy design efficiently incentivizes the venue's infrastructure investment, and we prove that our tariff achieves the highest app's revenue among a general class of tariffs. Furthermore, we derive some counter-intuitive guidelines for the POI-based collaboration. For example, a bandwidth-consuming app should collaborate with a low-quality venue (users have low utilities when consuming the venue's products).
KW - Network economics
KW - Stackelberg game
KW - business model
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85084931713&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/TMC.2019.2910264
DO - 10.1109/TMC.2019.2910264
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85084931713
SN - 1536-1233
VL - 19
SP - 1420
EP - 1433
JO - IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
JF - IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
IS - 6
M1 - 8685197
ER -