Launching big data-driven credit payment services? Role of power structure in a dual-channel supply chain

This study investigates a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, in which the manufacturer decides whether to launch big data-driven credit payment services on online direct-selling channels. Moreover, we consider two power structures, namely, the MS structure and RS structure, which differ in terms of whether the manufacturer’s equilibrium decision is made prior to or after the retailer’s equilibrium decision. By contrasting the firms’ equilibrium profits, we uncover that the retailer always benefits from the manufacturer’s credit payment services under the two power structures in contrast to the non-credit payment services. However, the manufacturer’s preference towards credit payment services is not unidirectional, that is, the manufacturer may prefer either the credit payment services or the non-credit payment services. Specifically, the manufacturer is reluctant to implement credit payment services if and only if both the discount of cash opportunity cost and increased demand are low; otherwise, the manufacturer has incentives to launch credit payment services. Moreover, our results demonstrate that in contrast to non-credit payment services, credit payment services result in the differentiation of retail prices and profits of the whole supply chain between the MS and RS structures.