How do green certificate and carbon emission trading impact clean energy investment? Evidence from evolutionary game modeling

As a major carbon emitter accounting for approximately 40% of China's total emissions, the power industry is central to achieving the China's dual carbon targets. To accelerate decarbonization, China has implemented several market-based mechanisms, especially carbon emission trading system for production-side emissions and green certificate trading system for consumption-side responsibilities. While clean energy investment is a fundamental long-term pathway, coordination in the power supply chain between generators and sellers involves complex dynamics shaped by consumer preferences and potential free-riding behaviors. We construct an evolutionary game model to analyze investment coordination strategies within the electricity supply chain. Using empirical data for sensitivity analysis, we examine how initial investment probabilities and exogenous parameters such as clean energy costs, carbon prices, electricity prices, and green certificate prices shape collaborative decisions. Key findings identify specific economic thresholds: carbon prices exceeding 326 CNY per ton, electricity prices surpassing 0.83 CNY per kWh, and green certificate prices rising above 68.89 CNY per certificate can trigger decisive shifts toward coordinated investment. Carbon and green certificate prices exert a stronger influence on generators, whereas electricity prices predominantly affect sellers. Crucially, the efficient operation of the green certificate market enhances overall investment efficiency and strengthens accountability for renewable energy consumption. These insights provide practical implications for policymakers seeking to optimize carbon and green certificate trading mechanisms, thereby incentivizing coordinated clean energy investment across the electricity supply chain and supporting the achievement of dual carbon goals.