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Competition between a manufacturer and a relicensing third party when customers are strategic

  • Qingyuan Zhu
  • , Chenghao Yu
  • , Zhiyang Shen
  • , Malin Song*
  • *此作品的通讯作者
  • Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics
  • Univ. Lille
  • Anhui University of Finance and Economics

科研成果: 期刊稿件文章同行评审

摘要

This study presents an analytical framework for examining how remanufacturing rate, consumer buying behavior, and consumer preferences impact a supply chain's economic and environmental outcomes. An original equipment manufacturer and a third-party remanufacturer make decisions influenced by the competitive leverage of relicensing fees and the maximum available quantity of remanufactured products. We analyze this monopoly scenario in a two-period model, assuming that consumers are strategic. The remanufacturing rate has a nonmonotonic impact on the economic outcomes of this supply chain system, and excellent environmental improvement is not an inevitable consequence of a high remanufacturing rate.

源语言英语
页(从-至)2021-2040
页数20
期刊Managerial and Decision Economics
44
4
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 6月 2023
已对外发布

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