基于组合拍卖与统一价格的停车位最优分配研究

This paper considers a parking service platform that provides two types of parking modes simultaneously: reservation mode and first-come-first-served mode. An optimal integer programming model is proposed to maximize the overall utility of bidders and the platform. The uniform price is introduced into a one-sided Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (O-VCG) combinatorial auction mechanism. The proposed novel O-VCG combinatorial auction mechanism helps to achieve the goals of incentive compatibility, individual rationality and allocative efficiency. The numerical study demonstrates the effects of the bid distribution and bidder quantity on the parking allocation strategy and the overall utility of the two modes. The results indicate that when the average value of bids is close to the uniform price of single parking time slot, the O-VCG combinatorial auction mechanism can realize the optimal allocation of the two types of parking modes and ensure the system robustness.