The perishable goods buyer pricing opaque sales mode set the opacity of strategy analysis

Jun Li Lei, Jin Lin Li*, Lun Ran, Wen Si Zhang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Based on non-cooperative game theory with incomplete information, the game between suppliers and agents during the opaque sales was analyzed. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium threshold price which settled by suppliers and the opacity setting strategy of agents were obtained. The results show that under the premise of the customer's successful bidding, the more the number of suppliers, the higher the information rent which agents gain from the game. However, with the increase in the number of suppliers, the opacity of goods also increase which result in the decreasing of customer's quotation. Thus, the agents need to make a trade-off between their earnings and the opacity degree of their product.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-6
Number of pages6
JournalBeijing Ligong Daxue Xuebao/Transaction of Beijing Institute of Technology
Volume34
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2014

Keywords

  • Opaque sales
  • Perishable assets
  • Reverse price

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