Signaling game analysis on B2C transaction of online pharmacy

  • Qiuju Yin*
  • , Peng Miao
  • , Li Feng
  • *Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

    Abstract

    Online medicine sale is an important form of pharmaceutical enterprises in developing e-commerce. As the particularity of the medicine compared to other products, how the customer judge the quality of the medicine sold by online pharmacies have received special attentions. The paper analyzes the process of transactions between online pharmacies and customers using the method of signaling game and establishes a signaling game model of medicine transaction. In the model, the price of medicine is selected as a signal of pharmacies to transfer their own quality types. The separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium of the two sides in transaction are obtained. The study has some reference value for customers to judge the quality types of online pharmacies, and then improve transaction efficiency of online pharmacies.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publication2011 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government, ICEE2011 - Proceedings
    Pages1570-1573
    Number of pages4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2011
    Event2nd International Conference on E-Business and E-Government, ICEE 2011 - Shanghai, China
    Duration: 6 May 20118 May 2011

    Publication series

    Name2011 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government, ICEE2011 - Proceedings

    Conference

    Conference2nd International Conference on E-Business and E-Government, ICEE 2011
    Country/TerritoryChina
    CityShanghai
    Period6/05/118/05/11

    Keywords

    • B2C
    • equilibrium
    • online pharmacies
    • signaling game

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