TY - JOUR
T1 - Secure Communication Against Active UAV Eavesdropper
T2 - A Fingerprint-Localization and Channel Tracking Approach
AU - Wang, Xinyao
AU - Zheng, Zhong
AU - Fei, Zesong
AU - Wu, Qingqing
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 IEEE. All rights reserved.
PY - 2025
Y1 - 2025
N2 - Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) can be threatening to the information security of wireless communications. By launching the pilot spoofing attack (PSA), a UAV, operating as the active aerial-eavesdropper (A-Eve), is able to intercept the confidential messages sent over the air. On one hand, it is difficult to distinguish the channel state information (CSI) of the ground users (GUs) and the CSI of A-Eve in the contaminated pilots. On the other hand, due to the high-mobility of A-Eve, the CSI of A-Eve is rapidly changing, making the design of secure transmissions challenging. To address these issues, we first propose a location-based minimum mean square error (MMSE) channel estimation algorithm to separate the CSI of GUs and the CSI of A-Eve, where the location of A-Eve is obtained by designing a cooperative localization neural network (CLNet), leveraging its angular-domain channel fingerprint (CF) of A-Eve. Furthermore, we propose an artificial noise (AN) injected MMSE precoding scheme to maximize the worst-case secrecy rate of the multi-user communications, where the power allocation between signal and AN is optimized via a long short-term memory (LSTM)-based secure predictive beamforming neural network (SPBNet). Numerical results verify the secrecy performance gain of the proposed scheme achieved by utilizing the localization ability via the CLNet and the channel tracking ability via the SPBNet, compared to the canonical nullspace AN injection scheme without prior knowledge of A-Eve’s location.
AB - Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) can be threatening to the information security of wireless communications. By launching the pilot spoofing attack (PSA), a UAV, operating as the active aerial-eavesdropper (A-Eve), is able to intercept the confidential messages sent over the air. On one hand, it is difficult to distinguish the channel state information (CSI) of the ground users (GUs) and the CSI of A-Eve in the contaminated pilots. On the other hand, due to the high-mobility of A-Eve, the CSI of A-Eve is rapidly changing, making the design of secure transmissions challenging. To address these issues, we first propose a location-based minimum mean square error (MMSE) channel estimation algorithm to separate the CSI of GUs and the CSI of A-Eve, where the location of A-Eve is obtained by designing a cooperative localization neural network (CLNet), leveraging its angular-domain channel fingerprint (CF) of A-Eve. Furthermore, we propose an artificial noise (AN) injected MMSE precoding scheme to maximize the worst-case secrecy rate of the multi-user communications, where the power allocation between signal and AN is optimized via a long short-term memory (LSTM)-based secure predictive beamforming neural network (SPBNet). Numerical results verify the secrecy performance gain of the proposed scheme achieved by utilizing the localization ability via the CLNet and the channel tracking ability via the SPBNet, compared to the canonical nullspace AN injection scheme without prior knowledge of A-Eve’s location.
KW - channel fingerprint-based localization
KW - channel tracking
KW - massive MIMO
KW - Pilot spoofing attack
KW - predictive beamforming
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=105001057646&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/TCOMM.2025.3552729
DO - 10.1109/TCOMM.2025.3552729
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:105001057646
SN - 1558-0857
JO - IEEE Transactions on Communications
JF - IEEE Transactions on Communications
ER -